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1 Introduction
ThecontemporarytheoreticaltermfocusoriginatesinHalliday(1967),whosaid
that the capitalized phrases in sentences (1)–(4) have a grammatical property
which he called information focus.
(1) (Who painted the shed yesterday?)
JOHN painted the shed yesterday.
(2) (When did John paint the shed?)
John painted the shed YESTERDAY.
(3) Mary always goes to TOWN on Saturdays.
(4) Mary always goes to town on SATURDAYS.
In cases such as (1)–(2), the location of focus is conditioned by how the sen-
tence containing the focus ﬁts into its context, here the question. The examples
illustrate that if the questioned element is changed, the locus of focus changes in
parallel. Strikingly, in other cases focus has a truth-conditional semantic effect.
If last year, Mary went to town on a Wednesday half a dozen times, then (4) is
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false (as a generalization about this time period) but (3) may be true. If on half
a dozen Saturdays she took a walk in the woods and avoided town, then (3) is
false, but (4) may still be true.
2 Grammatical Representation of Focus
Focus is a grammatical property which has a phonology (some kind of promi-
nence) and a semantics and/or pragmatics (a topic which will be discussed
later). In this respect, it is like content words or features such as tense, which
also have an inﬂuence on both sides of the form/meaning correspondence. To
link the two, it is usually assumed that focus is represented syntactically, by
means of a syntactic feature or other piece of syntactic representation. This
move was made by Jackendoff (1972), who introduced a syntactic feature which
is written F. The F feature marks the focused phrase, and a phrase which is not
marked with F is unfocused. Thus the focus feature is simply a binary-valued
syntactic feature. (5) and (6) correspond to (1) and (2).
(5) [S[NPJohn]F [VP[VPpainted [NPthe shed]] [NPyesterday]]]
(6) [S[NPJohn] [VP[VPpainted [NPthe shed]] [NPyesterday]F]]
The point of the F feature is to link the phonology of focus with the seman-
tics and pragmatics of focus. This is done with independent phonological and
semantic principles which refer to the F feature. (7) is the phonological princi-
ple from Jackendoff (1972). It says that F corresponds to stress prominence in a
certain domain. Jackendoff’s semantic principle was (8). It generates a semantic
object which has variables in the position of focus phrases. The Presupposition
corresponding to (5) is an open proposition ‘y painted the shed yesterday’, with
a variable y in the position of the focused phrase.
(7) If a phrase P is chosen as the focus of a sentence S, the highest stress in
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stress rules.
(8) The semantic material associated with surface structure nodes dominated
by F is the Focus of the sentence. To derive the Presupposition, substitute
appropriate semantic variables for the focused material.
To avoid confusion with the standard notion of presupposition in natural lan-
guage semantics, it is better to substitute another technical term for Jackendoff’s
Presupposition. Let’s call this semantic object which has variables substituted
for focused phrases the focus skeleton. As we will see, the focus skeleton is
closely related to the constructs used in current semantic accounts of focus. A
rough idea is that the focus skeleton functions as a schema which is matched
to the discourse context, and which is referred to in the semantics of certain
constructions.
3 Breadth of Focus
The F feature resolves representationally the question of what phrase or phrases
are focused. In a given syntactic tree, the focused phrases are the phrases which
bear the F feature. A focus on a relatively small phrase, such as a phrase with
a single word as a terminal string, is said to be a “narrow” focus. (9) gives
examples of narrow focus in a question context.
(9)a. (What did Mary do to Fluffy?)
She fedF Fluffy.
b. (What cats did Mary feed?)
She fed FluffyF.
A focus on a relatively large phrase such as verb phrase containing several
words is said to be a broad focus or wide focus. The terminology is natural,
because the interval of words fed Fluffy is broader (or wider) then the interval
of words fed and the interval of words Fluffy. (10) illustrates broad focus on VP60 Rooth
in a question context.
(10) (What did Mary do when she got home?)
She [fed Fluffy]F.
In both (9b) and in (10) the principal prominence falls on the ﬁrst syllable of
Fluffy, as is predicted by the phonological constraint (7). Jackendoff (1972) put
forth the hypothesis that, ﬁxing a phonological representation which has sen-
tence stress on the ﬁrst syllable of Fluffy in she fed Fluffy, syntactic F-marking
could be either on the object [Fluffy], the VP [fed Fluffy], or indeed the entire
sentence [she fed Fluffy]. So on this hypothesis, the breadth of focus is often
ambiguous, if one pays attention only to a phonological representation.
However, breadth of focus can be constrained by phonological phrasing.
In the narrow-focus example (11), it seems the major phrase break can follow
either the subject Magdalena, or the verb fed.
(11) Which cats did your sister Magdalena feed?
(MagdaLEna )( fed FLUFfy)
(MagdaLEna fed )( FLUFfy)
If we switch focus to the VP as in (12), it seems that the pronunciation with
the major phrase break after fed is impossible.
(12) What did your sister Magdalena do when she got home?
?? (MagdaLEna fed )( FLUFfy)
(MagdaLEna )( fed FLUFfy )
Selkirk (1984) introduced the hypothesis that F marking in examples like
(10) is nested. Both verb fed and the nominal Fluffy are novel in the discourse,
the reasoning goes, and so they are marked with F’s. The correct representation
for (10) on this account is (13).
(13) (What did Mary do when she got home?)Anaphoric Focus 61
She [fedF FluffyF]F
4 Scope of Focus
The phonological constraint (7) refers not just to a focus, but to the notion of
a phrase being the focus of a sentence. Assuming that there is a focus on John
in example (14), is John the focus of the embedded sentence [John was at the
party], or of the containing sentence [that John was at the party is certain]? Just
locating an F feature on John as in (15) does not resolve the question.
(14) Who was at the party?
That JOHN was at the party // is CERtain.
(15) That JohnF was at the party is certain.
Onphonologicalgrounds,onecanarguethatthesentenceSreferredtointhe
constraint (7) must be the embedded sentence in this case. While John is more
prominent than anything else in the embedded sentence, it is probably not more
prominent than certain. Truckenbrodt (1995) discussed data like (16) where ac-
cording to an analysis of Rooth (1992), there are F-features on American and
Canadian. Truckenbrodt pointed out that while American is more prominent
than farmer, arguably the most prominent syllable in the sentence as whole is
joke. So if we want to maintain the constraint (7), we can not say that Ameri-
can is the focus of the whole sentence in (15), because that would require that
American has highest stress prominence in the whole sentence. Note that in this
case, there is no embedded sentence, so there is no choice of S for which the
constraint (7) is observed. Truckenbrodt called the stretch of phonological ma-
terial within which a focus is maximally prominent the domain of the focus, and
suggested that the domain of the focus on American is an American farmer or
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(16) An AmericanF farmer told a CanadianF farmer a joke.
There is also a semantic side to this argument. (17a) is the focus skeleton
obtained from the embedded sentence in (15). It can be matched to the question
context by matching the variable y to the wh-phrase. (We will see later how
this matching process can be formalized.) On the other hand, (17b) is the focus
skeleton obtained using the matrix sentence. This does not match the question
context. So also on semantic grounds, there is reason to think that John is the
focus of the embedded sentence.
(17)a. Focus skeleton for embedded sentence in (14)
‘y was at the party’
b. Focus skeleton for matrix sentence in (14)
‘that y was at the party is certain’
The dimension of variation which is illustrated in (17) is called the scope
of focus. In (16), the scope of the focus on American is the containing nominal
[American farmer] or [an American farmer], not the whole sentence. And in
(14), the scope of the focus on John is the embedded sentence, not the matrix.
While the notion of scope is in fact implicit in both the phonological con-
straint (7) and the semantic constraint (8), a syntactic representation of scope
does not follow immediately from postulating an F feature. Rooth (1992) pro-
posed that the scope of an F is ﬁxed by a “focus interpretation” operator ∼ k,
which also speciﬁes an antecedent k for the focus skeleton. Chomsky (1971)
suggested that the scope of focus is marked representationally by covert move-
ment.
Schwarzschild (1999) made a more parsimonious proposal: in trees with
nested conﬁgurations of F marking, one F delimits the scope of another. A rep-
resentation for (15) where the scope of the focus on John is the embedded clause
is (18). Effectively, the maximal scope of an F on a node α is the maximal
phrase β which dominates α and is not F-marked. Since in (18) the embeddedAnaphoric Focus 63
that-clause is F-marked but the embedded S is not, the scope is the embedded
S.
(18) [[that [JohnF was at the party]]F[isF certainF]F]
5 Focus Anaphoricity
Focus anaphoricity is the hypothesis that the semantics and pragmatics of focus
involves a relation to context which is a kind of anaphora. Suppose we put (18)
back into its context, and add an index which indicates that the “antecedent” for
the focus on John is the question. Then we arrive at something along the lines
of (19), which gives one option using the representation where the scope of F is
delimited by F, and another option where the scope is delimited by ∼.
(19) [Who was at the party]6
[[That [JohnF6 was at the party]]F[isFcertainF]F]
[[That [JohnF was at the party]∼ 6] [is certain]]
The rough idea is that the focus (or the focus interpretation operator) is
allowedtobecoindexedwiththequestion(andthustobelicensedbyit)because
the focus skeleton (17a) matches the question. A couple of descriptive classes
of matching can be identiﬁed. Sometimes the antecedent looks like the scope of
the focus, but with something else of the same type substituted for the focused
phrase. (20) is an example, where John in the antecedent substitutes for the
F-marked Mary. Call this a substitution focus.
(20) [John wrote the report]4.
[No, [MaryF4 wrote it]]F.
Rooth(1992)analyzedconﬁgurationswheretheantecedentisasetofpropo-
sitions. This includes the question conﬁguration as in (19), on the hypothesis
that the semantic value of a question is a set of propositions. In some cases64 Rooth
the set of propositions is implicit in a discourse representation. The pragmatic
logic of the scalar quantity implicature example (21) refers to a set of alterna-
tive assertions, such as the assertion that Paul passed and the assertion that Steve
passed, where Steve and Paul are two of the speaker’s co-students. The index 2
can be taken to be the referential index of this set of propositions.
(21) How did the exam go?
[Well [IF2 passed]]F
An F whose antecedent is a set of propositions is called an alternative-set
focus. Another class of antecedents have an existentially quantiﬁed phrase re-
placing the focus in the antecedent. (22) is an example.
(22) [Mary spoke to someone about his problems]8
[Yeah, [she spoke to JohnF8 about his problems]]F
6 Focus Interpretation
Formal-semantic developments of focus anaphoricity state conditions on what
can be an antecedent for a focus. For instance, we want to rule out the represen-
tation (23), which has an inappropriate correspondence between question and
answer.
(23) [Who painted the shed yesterday]2
[John painted the shed [yesterday]F2]
Rooth (1992) stated a constraint covering alternative-set focus which works
as follows. One ﬁrst generates a set X of propositions by making all possible
substitutions for the variables in the focus skeleton. This object is called a focus
semantic value. The constraint on the antecedent is that it be a subset of X
containing the ordinary semantic value of the focused phrase and something
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yesterday, so the set X contains propositions like ‘John painted the shed on
Nov. 19th, 2006’, ‘John painted the shed on Nov. 20th, 2006’, ‘John painted
the shed in 2005’, and so forth, with various choices for the frame time adverb
substituting for yesterday. The antecedent question, on a theory where questions
denote sets of propositions, denotes a set Y containing propositions such as
‘John painted the shed on Nov. 20th, 2006’, ‘Mary painted the shed on Nov.
20th, 2006’, ‘Bill painted the shed on Nov. 20th, 2006’, assuming the yesterday
to be determined by the time of utterance being Nov. 20th 2006. Since ‘Mary
painted the shed on Nov. 20th, 2006’ is an element of Y but not of X, the
constraint Y ⊆ X is not satisﬁed, and the representation (23) is not licensed.
This is what we want.
What about substitution focus? Rooth (1992) stated a second clause case
which allows the antecedent to be an element of the focus semantic value rather
than a subset of it. This is unattractive, because the deﬁnition is disjunctive.
Schwarzschild (1999) solved this problem by giving a uniform constraint which
covers alternative-set focus and substitution focus, and also covers existential
antecedents as in (22). The new constraint checks entailment between a propo-
sition a derived from the antecedent, and a proposition f derived from the focus
skeleton. In f, focus variables are existentially quantiﬁed, and if the antecedent
has propositional type, a is simply the proposition denoted by the antecedent.
This already covers (22), because a is ‘Mary spoke to some person x about x’s
problems’, while f is ‘Mary spoke to some entity x about x’s problems’. Since
a entails f, the representation (22) is licensed.
In alternative-set focus, the antecedent denotes a set of propositions, or
in a functional type system, a characteristic function of a set of propositions.
The corresponding type label is (st)t, where st is the type label for proposi-
tions. Schwarzschild’s axiom concerning antecedents with functional types is
that they are saturated to the type t by plugging in existentially quantiﬁed vari-
ables for the arguments. He uses Karttunen’s semantics for questions, where in66 Rooth
a world w, a question denotes a set of propositions which are true in w (Kart-
tunen 1977). Let’s look at (24), which is the indexed representation for (9b).
In a world w, the question denotes the characteristic function of the set of true
propositions of the form feed(Mary,y), where y is a cat in w. To existentially
quantify the argument of this characteristic function is to require that there be
some true proposition of the form feed(Mary,y), i.e. to require that that Mary
fed some cat. Skipping some details related to the possible-worlds framework,
the result is that a is the proposition ∃y[cat(y) ∧ feed(Mary,y)]. f is the
proposition ∃y[feed(Mary,y)],s oa entails f.
(24) [What cats did Mary3 feed]4
[She3 [fed [Fluffy]F4]]
We can conjecture that entailment semantics properly generalizes the repre-
sentations licensed in alternative semantics, so that speciﬁc analyses which use
alternative semantics can be ported to entailment semantics without changing
the representation of the antecedents or the indexing relations. Some additional
issues remain. Schwarzschild (1999) proposed that the entailment constraint
is applied at any non-F-marked node, not just the maximal scope of focus as
deﬁned above. In (24) the entailment constraint would be applied at the VP
level [fed FluffyF], as well as the S level. In such cases f is generated by ex-
istentially quantifying arguments. In this case this produces ∃x∃y[feed(x,y)],
which is entailed by the same antecedent a. In this version of entailment seman-
tics (which is the ofﬁcial version of Schwarzschild’s givenness semantics), one
should not speak of the unique scope of a focus, but of the possibly multiple
levels where the entailment constraint is applied. These are simply the non-F-
marked phrases.Anaphoric Focus 67
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